A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL LIMITATIONS IN MENKITI’S CONCEPT OF PERSONHOOD

Charles Ikechukwu Okoro, Christian C. Emedolu (PhD), Jude Godwins (PhD)

Abstract


The human person has become in our time the center of experimental science more than ever before. Indeed, we get the type of society we deserve. And this depends on the measure of the quality of persons in any given society. There are a host of many things that compete with the human person in terms of value. The reality is that such values score quite low in comparison to the value inherent in the human person. Every human endeavor, be it cultural, socio-political, and economical draws its meaning and significance in the measure in which it revolves around or points to the human person in all his existentiality. When the human person at any particular phase of his life is stripped of his rights and dignity it spells doom for the society. This is especially true when a person is considered purely from a normative angle. The normative consideration that stripped personhood off the child at infant stage is a case in point; this being a position vehemently defended by Menkiti. The reality is that such a standpoint is bound to raise serious moral issues. The objective of this article is, therefore, to discuss some of these moral lapses in Menkiti’s concept of personhood. It will also address the issue of the restriction of individual freedom- a position that draws its inspiration from Menkiti interpretation of Mbiti’s dictum: ‘‘I am because we are, and because we are, therefore, I am.’’ 

Keywords


Analysis, Moral, Limitation, Personhood, Menkiti

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 ISSN (Print):   2695-2319

ISSN (Online): 2695-2327

 

 

   

 

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