THE NOTION OF ‘SELF’ IN LOCKE’S PERSONAL IDENTITY THEORY

Taiwo Wesley Osemwegie (PhD)

Abstract


In Locke’s theory of personal identity, he treated the idea of the self as distinct from the idea of man and human being. For some thinkers, like Mead, the self is not different from one’s action and interaction. This argument is from those who expressed communicative action. Another school, especially the empiricist school was critical of the notion of the self. In fact, a blanket assertion made in respect of the self is that it is an illusion. A consideration of these varied perspectives about the self, call to question what exactly is the notion of the self? By what identity can the self be attributed? What is the epistemic and pragmatic nature and conception of the self? The attempt to provide answers to the above questions led to the consideration of some scholars’ conception of the self. In all, the research discovered that the self is a mixture of innate characteristics and social construction. Thus, the self is neither purely transcendental nor wholly social. Using the method of analysis, the paper concluded that there is no clear-cut cognitive epistemic grasp about the nature of the self but relative and skeptic outlook. 

Keywords


Lockean self, personal identity theory, mind, self-consciousness, skepticism.

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