APPRAISING THE IDEA OF PERSON IN LOCKE’S THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AND AFRICAN ONTOLOGY
Abstract
The idea of person continues to elicit elucidation in social and philosophical discourses. This is because it is only person that asks questions about itself, other beings and the entire cosmos. The assertion by Protagoras that man/person is the measure of all things no doubt depicts the rational cognitive capacity that nature has bestowed on man/person. The meaning accorded to the idea of person varies from one philosophical orientation to another and this disparity seems not to be a settled issue. It is in this regard that this paper is aimed at examining the idea of person in African ontology and Locke’s theory of personal identity. The goal is to critically expose the inclusive and exclusive features of the idea of person in African ontology and Lockean notion of person in his theory of personal identity. It remains unclear how person in African ontology can be referred to as a soul, spirit and body whereas in Locke’s notion, a person is strictly a moral agent capable of thought and a conscious entity. The paper therefore argued that it either African ontological notion of person is mistaken or Lockean notion is right. Conversely, it is either the Lockean notion is mistaken or the African ontological notion is correct. Albeit the discrepancy/inconsistency, the paper concludes that, that the idea of a person is largely a moral one in both conceptions— underpins the foundation upon which the generic/universal idea of a person should be conceptualized. The paper employed the method of analysis.
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