PARADIGM SHIFTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PERCEPTIONS, MISCALCULATIONS AND THE FIRST GULF WAR

Hysaint Eiguedo-Okoeguale (PhD)

Abstract


This article interrogates America’s involvement in the Gulf region and the decisions that led to the First Gulf War in 1990. It adopts the individual level of analysis theory, which argues that perceptions, choices and actions of individual human beings, such as great leaders often influence the course of history. The study therefore, argues that the First Gulf War could have been averted. This is because there was no overwhelming systemic pressure that brought the belligerents into conflict. Indeed, if both actors, George Bush and Saddam Hussein had widened their perceptions in the prelude to the conflict, it is unlikely that the operation, which was coded “Desert Storm” would not have transpired. To be sure, Saddam Hussein would not have underestimated America’s military resolve, and the United States would have taken Saddam’s overtures more seriously. It further argues that Margaret Thatcher and George Bush turned to history for guidance when they responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Indeed, Bush and Thatcher used analogies to Hitler of the 1930s, the Vietnam War and the Falklands War to frame the crisis, which ultimately influenced their policy of the coalition force Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait in February 1991. The articles concludes that despite the much-heralded success of military victory, multilateral diplomacy and international law, the First Gulf War has continued to elicit reactions from experts, professionals and scholars across the globe, many years after it had been fought, won and lost.


Keywords


Cease-fire, perceptions, miscalculations, Invasion, coalition forces.

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 ISSN (Print):   2695-2319

ISSN (Online): 2695-2327

 

 

   

 

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